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NARRATIVE, LUCK AND ETHICS:
The Role of Chance in Ethical Encounters,
in Literature and Real Life Experiences
This paper takes up an initial inquiry--a work at
its beginnings. The particular project examines
the role of chance in people's ethical experience.
I became interested in chance through research
I carried out several years ago. In two different
projects, in interviews with adolescents and with
adults, people reported real-life ethical conflicts
that had certain features that were puzzling.
Later, I realized that these ethical dilemmas
came about in part because of what some would
call chance or luck: And, they seemed to stay
with people, reverberating over time like the
ever-widening circles on a pond caused by some
striking object. At that time, I discovered the
work of philosopher Martha Nussbaum(1986;
1990). Nussbaum is uncovering the place of
luck in people' ethical experiences for Moral
Philosophy. She does that through literature, re-
examining certain classic Greek plays--the works
of Euripides and Aeschylus--and the novels of
writers such as Henry James and Charles
Dickens--The Golden Bowl, David Copperfield.
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Nussbaum argues for the inclusion of works of
fiction in the study of Moral Philosophy because
they alone can capture and reveal particular
aspects of our ethical experiences. They can, she
believes, especially show human response to
difficult choices in the face of luck, when there
are no harmless possibilities, when some wrong
will be done and cannot be avoided.
As a psychologist, I find Nussbaum's work
compelling. She is addressing issues similar to
ones I discovered in people's self-reported
ethical experiences. When asked to tell about a
moral or ethical conflict of their own, some
people construct narratives that involve chance,
that is, their conflicts seem precipitated by some
chance event over which they have no control.
Yet Moral Psychology--like Moral Philosophy--
has not yet developed a model of moral or
ethical development that takes into account
experiences of chance in people's lives in spite
of the fact that most people readily acknowledge
the role of luck in life's happenings, in events
they would call "ethical" encounters.
In this paper, I take up these issues to do two
things: 1) to share some interviews describing
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people's actual ethical dilemmas that are
connected to chance; and, then, 2) to say how I
believe these events act in people's lives,
especially to suggest how they foster moral
deliberation. Finally, I want to raise for
discussion the question: What might the
inclusion of chance mean to the creation of a
more adequate theory of ethical development?
Chance in People's Life Experiences and in
Moral Theory: Contexts
Let me begin with a definition. Following the
work of Nussbaum (1986; 1990), a chance event
is defined here as one of those happenings that
are part of an individual's life experiences and
circumstances over which he or she may not
have control. Hence, one can be subject to
chance or change through occurrences that were
unforseen or unforeseeable. These events can,
Nussbaum suggests, be a powerful component of
one's ethical development, especially if they
involve things one cares deeply about.
My interest in these ideas first emerged from
observations made in a study of students at the
Emma Willard School, a private school for girls
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in Troy, New York (Gilligan, Lyons and
Hanmer, 1990). In open-ended interviews, girls
participating in the study were asked to describe
themselves, their relationships with others and
ethical conflicts they had experienced. Initiated
in 1981 by the Emma Willard School, this
project, which followed girls over their four
years of high school, had two purposes: to help
Emma Willard teachers and administrators better
understand girls' ways of knowing and learning
and making choices, including ethical choices;
and, to begin mapping the largely neglected
domain of adolescent girls' development
(Gilligan, Lyons & Hanmer, 1990; see also,
Adelson, 1980; Adelson & Doehrman, 1980;
Douvan & Adelson, 1966; Gilligan, 1990).
Under particular scrutiny was how girls might
make use of two moral orientations in their
ethical decision making: an orientation towards
concerns of justice, rights and fairness, the
traditionally identified ethic of justice,
(Kohlberg, 1969); or an orientation to concerns
of responsiveness to others' needs and one's
own (an ethic of care [Gilligan, 1977; 1982;
Lyons, 1982; 1983]). Results of this work,
which confirmed girls' interest in and use of
both ethics, were presented in the book Making
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Connections: The Relational Worlds of
Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School
(Gilligan, Lyons and Hanmer, 1990).
But in a subsequent re-examination of these data
a new dimension emerged: Girls' descriptions of
their ethical deliberations revealed their
awakening responses to life's realities and
showed how sometimes seemingly simple
chance events entered into their thinking, their
moral decision making and their relationships to
others.
The potential connection of chance to ethical
decision-making or development has not been
seriously examined in adolescent theory
building. Indeed, the concept of chance with its
insistence on the particular and concrete, the real
rather than the ideal, counters traditional notions
of adolescence: These posit adolescence as a
time of a preoccupation with idealism and
ideology (Erikson, 1968), with the achievement
of abstract thinking (Piaget, 1965; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1958) and with the emergence of
transcendent ethical values (Kohlberg, 1969;
1984; Marcia, 1980). In its suggestion that one
important but little-explored strand of adolescent
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development may be coming to see,
acknowledge and deal with life's inescapable
realities, this work with its perspective, rooted in
part in the responses of adolescent girls,
challenges standard adolescent psychology.
Here I find it useful to tum to Nussbaum's
work. In tracing the interconnection of the ideas
of luck--chance--and ethics in classical Greek
thought and literature, Nussbaum illuminates an
element missing not just in contemporary moral
philosophy but in moral psychology as well
(Nussbaum, 1986; 1990; see also Williams,
1981; 1985).
This work in philosophy suggests, too, why this
topic may not have been addressed either in
adolescent psychology or in moral psychology.
For this line of thinking about chance has been
almost eliminated from Greek thought and our
own. Through certain powerful ethical traditions
beginning with Plato and including Kant,
Nussbaum argues, "the goodness of a good
human life has been made safe from luck" by
placing it under the power of reason. "Putting
that Iife...under the control of the agent, an
element of reliance upon the external and
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undependable was removed" (Nussbaum, 1986,
p. 4). Kantians, for example, believe that the
domain of moral value is immune from the
assaults of luck. This is so, Kant would claim,
because a genuine moral obligation, by its very
nature, can never conflict with another genuine
obligation. By construing conflicting claims into
a hierarchical, ranked order, one can always
determine which is the first and only duty or
obligation, or right choice.
But, Nussbaum finds, Greek dramatists offered
no such comfort and playwrights like Aeschylus,
Sophocles and Euripides, through such
characters as Agamemnon or Antigone, tended
to consider unalterable human predicaments as
part of human experience and of a valued human
life. While Nussbaum sees stark examples in
these Greek plays--such as Agamemnon
confronting the sacrifice of his daughter--she
also finds similar ones in the more mundane,
though none-the-less significant moments of our
daily lives. She gives the example of a young
professional woman who, already scheduled to
present an important paper at a scholarly
conference, discovers that her daughter has just
been chosen for a leading part in a school play
---------- 7 ----------
to be performed on the same day as the
conference (Nussbaum, 1989). Nussbaum
articulates the ethical dimensions of these
chance events: that is, that in the most
vulnerable of our human activities, in our
relations to others, when we care deeply and
simultaneously for more than one thing, we
face the possibility of a human conflict in which
there may be no way to avoid harm. Yet these
inescapable and unalterable experiences may be
significantly and deeply at work in our moral
development, in the conflicts we encounter, and
in our deliberative thinking about them and
about how to live a good human life.
But the rational, ranking model of Kantian
ethical decision-making is reflected as well in
moral psychology. Indeed the dominant model in
the field, Kohlberg's justice model, is itself
hierarchically organized. It offers a way to
consider, reason, and rank situations and values
in determining how to make moral choices.
Similarly, in using an ethic of care, one can
assume that it is possible to decide who one is
to care for first.
This work in philosophy, however, alerts us to
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ask how people, like high school students, might
come to know and act on the unalterable
situations they find in their relations to others,
considering the chance events of their lives--
what they can and cannot control, what they
care deeply about--and how they come to realize
and act on these perceptions.
People's Experiences of Chance:
Acting When You Care Deeply About More
Than One Thing
Let me turn to one of the Emma Willard student
interviews that first captured my attention to see
how ethical conflicts students report can reveal
certain characteristics of these chance situations.
I begin with an Emma Willard student, Anne.
Each year over three years of her high school,
Anne described situations of conflict that stood
out for her, ones that she characterized as moral
conflicts. In contrasting two of these conflicts,
it is possible to see how and where chance
events entered into them--and how and where
they did not--and to speculate on their affect on
Anne and her developing sense of self.
As a sophomore, Anne described a seemingly
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everyday adolescent conflict that occurred when
a "really good friend," wanted her to go to her
house after school, but Anne couldn't reach her
mother: "I think she wanted me to stay
overnight or something because she had
problems and, I couldn't get a hold of my
mother, so I didn't know whether to go or not."
In that situation, Anne's major concerns were:
"My feeling of what I should do. And what my
mother would want me to do. I didn't want to
get in trouble." She goes on:
.... it hurts, I guess, I mean it
always hurts if you get in
trouble .... .! hate to have my
mother upset with me for
something... It hurts both of us I
think, you know, I don't think
she likes to get mad at me either.
To Anne, trouble was not just an effect, some
punishment, but involved hurt, both to her
mother and herself. When trying to think about
what to do, Anne introduces a second concern:
Well, ...it was something like I
want to go for my own selfish
reasons because I like to visit
with my friend and I think she
needs me there for her, too. I
don't think it is just my own
selfish reasons, but I think it
would be good for my friend to
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have me there when she needs
somebody to talk to or
something; and, then the other
side is I just don't want to do
something without mom's
permission, I don't want to get in
trouble ...and that my friend
wanted me to come, that also
helped affect me and my
decision. But the other side was
very strong, I mean my mother's
feelings on the subject was very
strong, if she didn't like it, then I
wouldn't do it, of course ...
In the end, Anne says, "I decided to go to my
friend's, which was fine, because my mother
wasn't mad anyway. She didn't mind at all."
To Anne that was the right thing to do.
"Because she would have let me do it and I
wanted to do it and it was important to my
friend that I do it. So three ways in one
direction is fine."
In the situation presented here, Anne grapples
with the inherent conflict of "trying to be
generous" to all the people around her, not
wanting to hurt her mother, being there for her
friend and also doing what she wants for her
own "selfish reasons." She struggles to make
her own decision, to be independent and to
consider, too, what she would like to do.
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But this situation, although presenting Anne with
a conflict, was clearly one within her control. As
she said, she did in fact decide to go to her
friend's house. Giving priority to one thing, she
acted on that. In contrast, a second conflict
Anne reported a year later reveals different
characteristics and different dynamics
precipitated by a chance event.
The second ethical conflict Anne discussed
occurred unexpectedly when her divorced father
announced that he was to be remarried. In that
situation, one over which she had no control,
Anne had to decide whether to tell her mother:
"It was really a hard decision on my part as to
whether and when to tell my mother that,
because on the one hand, I knew that it was
really going to kill her to find that out, and on
the other hand, I thought I had an obligation to
tell heL" Anne's conflict centered on the fact
that, while her mother and father were divorced,
she knew, "my mother still loved my father a
great deal" and "there was always hope there."
When asked by the interviewer to say why she
termed this situation a moral problem, Anne
indicated her own realization of life's
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contingencies, their interconnection with her
values and the difficulty of choosing between
things equally valued. Moral problems, Anne
said, usually occur for her when:
I am struggling against myself to come
to a solution to the problem because of
values. I can't decide and they are both
equally as important.
Anne describes the values that were conflicting
in the situation of her father's marriage:
"The fact that I had always been
brought up to care a tremendous
amount about my parents'
feelings and the way they feel.
On the one hand that conflicted
with itself because my mother's
feelings were going to be really
upset and my father's feelings
were good, so that conflicted
with itself. And urn, my (long
pause) trying to figure out, I
guess you would have to weigh
the love that I have for my
mother which is in effect my
morals, against if I love my
mother enough to tell her
something that she won't hear
from other places and get upset.
But then again, that's against
mainly the feeling that I've been
brought up with that I hate to see
any member of my family hurt
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and that would conflict against
that, so the two."
Thus Anne found herself caught in a dilemma of
telling her mother what she knew and risking
her hurt, or not telling her and risking the pain
her mother would inevitably feel when she did
learn of the remarriage. In the end, Anne
decided to reveal what she knew. In this
calculation, she also considered consequences to
herself: If she told, her mother would really be
upset with her and some of it would "fall back
on me because I live with her" and "terrible
things like that really bother her but they hit me
hard." When she did talk with her mother, she
also knew that she and her sister, who joined in
the telling, could give the mother "our personal
support so she could handle it."
In this dilemma, Anne confronts one of life's
small but terrible chance contingencies. Having
no control over her father's decision and facing
the impossibility of preventing hurt to her
mother, yet desiring good for her father and
understanding that she cares deeply for both of
her parents, Anne saw, acknowledged and dealt
with that situation. What is at work here is a
chance happening over which an individual has
no control, which involves things she cares
~,....,,....,--,....,----14 ----------
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deeply about, and over which she cannot choose
without some harm coming to someone.
One Effect of Chance: Moral Deliberation
In other interviews, adults reveal similar chance
elements in their ethical encounters. Like Anne,
they also elaborate another feature that seems
connected to people's experience of chance, that
is, their engagement in a kind of moral
deliberation. The case of a history teacher
offers one example of the way a chance event
created a ethical dilemma and fostered moral
deliberation (Lyons, 1990B).
The history teacher, an experienced, master
teacher, told this story:
When I first started as a teacher,
I was quite a showman. I was a
performer. I could hold ten balls
in the air at once. The kids
loved it. The parents loved it. I
was considered a great teacher.
The kids would look up at me
and say, IIGod, I love this
course. II But they weren't doing
history, they were watching the
show. It was only after I had
been teaching six or seven years
that I began to realize that I
wanted to (change). If memory
serves me it was a student ...he
shared that ball metaphor with
me and he said to me, "You
know, you're really wonderful
and it's exciting but you have to
show people how to do it. When
are you going to teach us how to
do it?" And that really forced
me, it led me to try to do that,
(to help kids become historians.)
But I had to make a decision. I
could say, 'Go away, you bother
me. Everybody likes me as I
am.' The kids had already
dedicated the yearbook to me,
teaching the old way. I had
gotten all this publicity, fame
whatever, from doing it as a
showman, .... I had to make a
decision.
Thus the teacher, confronted by an incredibly
perceptive student, is challenged to think about
his "showman" style of teaching and consider
engaging his students in a radically different
way of learning. But the history teacher
acknowledged something more: that responding
to his student created what he termed a "moral
dilemma," specifically in determining if he
should respond. For if the teacher does act to
respond, to help his students become historians,
he implies other changes as well: changes in his
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approach to his discipline, in his teaching
practices, and in his very way of interacting with
his students. In this reorganization, he comes to
a new way to conceive of himself as a teacher.
As he says, he did not have to respond, nor did
he have to change. Yet he describes himself
today as a "person who tries to teach kids how
they can do what I can do." As the teacher
changes, his students as "historians" will ply a
different set of tasks as learners, shifting to a
new way of knowing. This situation, which
came about because of a chance event, a kid's
question and suggestion, triggered a set of
ethical deliberations.
---------- 17 ----------
I have been particularly taken with this case. I
have heard this teacher tell this story several
times, repeating it in public over a number of
years. I believe this was a powerful experience.
And it reverberates with a point Nussbaum
makes, that is, that chance encounters, when
they involve things we care deeply about foster
moral reflection. The history teacher,
responding to his student's question, finds
himself reflecting on his craft, his reputation as
a teacher, the way he has been a "good" teacher
to his students and how he might better teach
them. Like, Anne, the Emma Willard student,
the history teacher ponders what to do
considering things he values deeply. Thus, an
uncontrollable chance event, a student's
question, precipitates both an ethical dilemma
and ethical reflection and deliberation.
While there is no way to generalize from these
small examples, it is interesting to speculate
whether this kind of reflection fosters ethical
considerations of a larger kind: How should one
conduct one's life and one's relations with
others-- students, family, workers? What is fair
or kind? How should one view the work one
does or will do in the world? And how should
one consider that it is good?
Another teacher, Ramon Parks, who teaches
philosophy in a small suburban high school,
spoke similarly about how teachers can find
ethical dilemmas in chance situations and how
they can engage moral reflection (Lyons,
1990B). In Parks' case a dilemma arose for him
in a class discussion of a controversial issue
when one of his students wanted Parks to reveal
his own opinion. The situation forced the
teacher to ask: "What is the context in which it
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is appropriate for me to express my opinion on
sensitive issues--euthanasia, suicide, abortion--
the kinds of things we are talking about?" Parks
elaborates why this is problemmatic for him:
They want to know my opinion
and yet there is a danger in my
mind of giving it too early
because often the dialogue stops
then. Now we know THE
ANSWER, we can go on. Some
kids don't do that, but a lot do.
So I try to create an environment
all year long whereby they are
willing to question your opinions
as another opinion and hopefully
reasoned, but still an opinion.
And then the conflict is reduced.
In the specific dilemma he encountered, Parks
found himself in a class discussion of a case of
euthanasia, where a nurse with a terminally ill
patient in a moment of crisis lets the patient die
without calling for help. For the teacher: "The
question is ,'Is the nurse right or wrong to do
that?' And I felt if not right, at least I could
understand what the nurse was doing, and I
thought it was a rational decision for her to take,
... and I thought that it was morally justifiable ...
I am sure it is not legally justifiable." In that
situation Parks saw that the students were not
giving the situation the attention it deserved, nor
were they treating it as "an open question."
They saw it as a closed question, and so he
ponders, "do I give my opinion and force it
open, running the risk that twenty-two kids will
change their vote because this is what the
teacher thinks, which is not what I want?"
Although he wants his students to formulate
positions and arguments, Parks admits the
difficulty of that goal: "Kids tend to be very
poor debaters. Their notion of debating is to say
things louder and louder, rather than searching
for some evidence .... .! would love to have them
develop the whole range of opinions and
arguments on their own -- be able to expound
the whole range before coming down someplace.
Kids usually see things right away as either right
or wrong, or (look for) instant answers and tend
not to go much farther than that."
Embedded in Parks' considerations is also the
students' own assumptions about the nature of
knowledge. Here the teacher takes that into
account as he struggles to determine just how
he can voice his own views in class discussion,
encourage the thinking of his students, and move
them to a new understandings. Here a situation
---------- 20 ----------
Implications
that occurs by chance even though it is one that
might reoccur causes the teacher to consider his
views, those of his students as well as what is
"good" for them as learners.
These cases do not fall easily into the traditional
decision rules of Moral Psychology or Moral
Philosophy. The experiences of the people
presented here illustrate how chance contributes
to ethical conflict and enters into ethical
decision making. Situations may involve things
one cares deeply about, and they may not
always be susceptible to ranking--like the love
for one's mother and one's father or the respect
one has for one's students or oneself as a
teacher. Indeed, recognizing that the value of
these incommensurable goods, goods that cannot
be ranked, creates conflict and deliberations--
some that one may never forget.
Martha Nussbaum (1986, 1990) asks one
question we need to explore:
To what extent can we
distinguish between what is up to
the world and what is up to us,
when assessing a human life?
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How much can reason--our
ability to deliberate and choose,
to make a plan in which ends are
ranked, to decide actively what is
to have value and how much--
control the happenings of our
lives? (pp. 3-7).
Nussbaum examines these questions in light of
Greek thought before the idea that luck could be
checked by reason took precedence in ethical
theory. Kantian ethics, for example, suggest that
practical reason is the best guide to moral life,
that two obligations can never conflict with one
another, and that there is always a way to rank
and choose among one's deeply held values.
But earlier Greek philosophers such as Aristotle
argued differently.
Nussbaum sees this idea of conflicting goods
joined with a fundamental question, one
Aristotle asks, that is: How should a human
being live? Nussbaum sees that in the stark
experiences of Antigone or Agamemnon or
Hecuba, the Greeks sought to portray the terrors
of confronting what chance or luck had decreed.
These experiences confront us with the
inevitability of ethical deliberation and engage
us in a dialectic that may contribute to our own
answers to how to live a good human life.
---------- 22 ----------
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As philosophers today recover this line of
thinking about contingency and the conflicts of
incommensurable values, moral psychologists
need to do the same. That people should reveal
the role of chance in their ethical dilemmas is
really not surprising--luck is a clearly
recognizable human phenomenon. What is
surprising is how little this factor has been
examined or explored in moral psychology.
Recognizing this phenomenon suggests an
important shift in the locus of what Moral
Psychology should consider as including the
moral dimensions of our lives. Past moral
theorizing, primarily the work of Kohlberg but
including Piaget as well, focussed on moral
judgments of discrete conflicts. Clearly this is
an appropriate realm, but, I would like to
suggest, an incomplete one for an adequate
theory of Moral Psychology. Judgments of
moral conflicts are only one dimension of our
moral lives. Taken alone they can obscure the
multiple dimensions and experiences of moral
development in all the exigencies and chance
events embedded in living a life. Indeed, life
histories may more adequately reveal the full
range of ethical dimensions of peoples' lives.
They at least ought to be added to what moral
psychologists take as the domain of their work.
These studies suggest, too, that future research
should consider systematically how the realities
and chance contingencies of life figure in
peoples' ways of knowing and in their ethical
and epistemological development. A framework
for the development of students' ways of
knowing articulated by Perry (1970) has been
elaborated on in the work of Belenky, Clinchy,
Goldberger and Tarule (1986) who suggest that
students move from a belief that knowledge is
fixed to the idea that knowledge is constructed.
How contingencies fit into this type of
epistemological development needs to be
identified as well. Clearly, dealing with
conflicts in which one must act in the face of
two or more unrankable values could hasten the
awareness that one acts on what oneself alone
can know. It may be that confronting a conflict
of incommensurable values precipitates this
developmental shift towards an understanding of
oneself as a constructivist.
In this paper, peoples' encounters with chance
have been used to examine a dialectic of ethical
development and to discern the intricate
---------- 24 ----------
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relationship between self, one's relations to
others and the chance happenings in human
experience. A new research agenda is suggested
by this work. It must consider that:
1. Chance events, those unalterable life
happenings, are intertwined in peoples'
lives and can be experienced as ethical
dilemmas they see and try to resolve;
2. Confronting these chance occurrences
over which one does not have control
has the effect of setting up a kind of
dialectic, an ethical deliberation. This is
likely because the situation usually
reveals deeply held values for people or
things, values which cannot be ranked.
3. The result of these deliberations is a
new awareness, a way of seeing one's
self, one's own values and others in their
concrete particularity, with their hopes,
fears, values and ideals--a kind of an
expansion of one's moral imagination;
4. This experience and recognition of
life's unalterable events and the resultant
deliberations they set in motion may be
a significant part of ethical and
intellectual development.
Awareness and understanding of the realities of
chance in life contexts is not just a moral
starting place, but one that may be an important
part of healthy development. Researchers and
practitioners, moral philosophers and
psychologists need to understand this
phenomenon more fully in all its rich
particularity and look not just to moral
judgments but to all aspects of peoples' lives
and the stories of it that they tell.
---------- 26 ----------
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